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Abstract
We investigate how lump-sum equalization transfers affect expenditures and taxes in
the municipalities of the largest German state North Rhine-Westphalia. In general,
those general-purpose transfers cannot be treated as exogenous variables. Thus,
for the identification of causal effects, two exogenous adjustments in the transfer
allocation formula are used as instrumental variables. Findings suggest the existence
of the “flypaper effect” – municipalities use transfers to increase expenditures but
do not reduce tax rates. Extra money from transfers is mainly used to finance social
expenditures and public facilities. A set of robustness checks, including a spatial
dependence model, confirm the results.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Equalization transfers from higher-level budgets play an important role as a source of revenue for 
municipal budgets. They are designed to cover the gap between the financial needs of the municipalities 
and their own tax revenues. The goals are, on the one hand, to help the municipalities provide an 
adequate level of public goods and on the other, to smooth regional disparities (Rosenfeld, 2010).  
The main type of transfer to the municipalities in Germany is the so-called non-matching or general-
purpose transfer. These transfers have a lump-sum character and are allocated on the basis of a formula 
that compares fiscal need and fiscal capacity. This type of financial support for municipalities exists in 
many countries. An often posed research question then is: What is the effect of such transfers on 
municipal spending? According to median voter theory, the effect on local government expenditures 
from changes in lump-sum intergovernmental transfers and from changes in private incomes should be 
equal (Bradford and Oates, 1971a, 1971b). This means that, depending on the income elasticity of the 
median voter, local governments should forward transfers to local taxpayers by lowering tax rates and 
increasing expenditure on the enhancement of public services and goods.  
In empirical terms, however, many authors find that compared to a rise in revenue from other sources 
there is a stronger increase in public spending in response to a rise in lump-sum intergovernmental 
transfers. This is the so-called “flypaper effect” (Gramlich et al., 1973).1 Another definition says that a 
flypaper effect appears if an increase in transfers is not used to cut local tax rates (Allers and Vermeulen, 
2016). The implication is that political agents conceal the lump-sum character of transfers and use the 
money to extend their budgets instead of refunding it to taxpayers (Dollery and Worthington, 1996). 
Various theoretical justifications for a flypaper effect involve the role of budget-maximizing bureaucrats 
(Wyckoff 1988), political agency (Brollo et al., 2013) or dynamic interactions between politicians and 
other interest groups (Singhal, 2008).  
In this paper, we examine the effect of general-purpose transfers on total and various subcategories of 
municipal expenditures and tax rates, taking the German federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia as a 
                                                     
1 The flypaper effect was also initially examined by Oates (1979), Courant et al. (1979), and Oates (1988). 
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case study. The contributions of the paper are the following. First, to the best of our knowledge, no 
empirical study before investigated the effect of transfers on different expenditure subcategories in 
German municipalities. We look into various expenditure subcategories because the control variables 
commonly used in the flypaper effect literature (e.g. age structure and population density) arguably do 
not affect all types of expenditures equally. Second, we employ a novel identification strategy based on 
exogenous adjustments in the formula used to calculate and apply modern statistical tests to confirm the 
robustness of our results. Third, we additionally apply a model with instrumental variables and spatial 
dependence to capture spatial correlation in the economic performance of the municipalities, which may 
affect both, the expenditures and the transfers. 
Many studies, e.g. Logan (1986); Grossman (1990); Dollery and Worthington (1995); Knight (2002) 
support the existence of the flypaper effect. However, several authors (e.g. Hamilton, 1983; Hines and 
Thaler, 1995) doubt its existence and criticize misguided empirical procedures (matching and non-
matching transfers mixed up together) or errors in statistical modeling (endogeneity not considered). 
According to Becker (1996), the flypaper effect is sensitive to the specification of the expenditure 
equations and the modeling of transfers to municipalities. She argues that potential endogeneity of 
transfers due to unobserved municipal characteristics, could bias the estimate of the spending response 
and suggests correcting for this. Other authors, such as Knight (2002) for US highway aid transfers and 
Gordon (2004) for US school district aid transfers, find that the flypaper effect disappears altogether 
after accounting for endogeneity with instrumental variables. On the other hand, in their quasi-
experimental studies examining the effect of non-matching transfers on local fiscal policy, Dahlberg et 
al. (2008) for Sweden, Allers and Vermeulen (2016) for the Netherlands, Ferede and Islam (2015) for 
Canada and Baskaran (2016) for Hesse in Germany find evidence for the existence of a flypaper effect 
(after accounting for endogeneity). The contradictory nature of these findings provides us with the 
motivation for a careful empirical investigation based on detailed data. 
The analysis in the paper is performed for the federal state North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW). It has 396 
municipalities that vary in wealth and other characteristics such as demographic composition and 
structure of expenditures. We exploit two adjustments in the fiscal equalization system in NRW to 
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identify the exogenous effect of transfers. The questions we ask are: Can a flypaper effect be identified 
for the municipalities of NRW? If so, which expenditure subcategories are influenced to a higher degree? 
Due to the fact that transfers are not earmarked it is especially interesting to see in which categories they 
are primarily spent, compared to the mean share of these categories within the overall municipal 
spending. Helpful insights for a central government can be derived – for instance if to some extend non-
matching transfers should be earmarked instead.  
Our study is most closely related to the studies by Ferede and Islam (2015) on Canadian provinces, 
Allers and Vermeulen (2016) on the Netherlands and Baskaran (2016) on Hesse in Germany. However, 
municipal transfers in Hesse are subject to special rules that do not exist in this form in other German 
federal states. In addition, we do not limit the estimations to a particular type of municipalities as done 
by Baskaran (2016). Different from the analysis of Ferede and Islam (2015) that concentrate on 
education expenditures only, we do not limit our investigation to one expenditure type. Instead, we 
include eight expenditure subcategories. Finally, and also in contrast to Allers and Vermeulen (2016), 
we apply a unique identification strategy based on the adjustments in the fiscal equalization system. 
Accordingly, we believe that our findings are more readily transferable to other German federal states 
and can claim greater overall validity.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section addresses the German fiscal equalization scheme 
and the background of the instruments used in the empirical part. The data is described in the third 
section. Section four specifies the empirical model. After that, the fifth section presents our results and 
discusses subsequent robustness checks. The sixth section concludes. 
2. FISCAL EQUALIZATION SCHEMES AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND IN 
NRW 
2.1. Municipal taxes and transfers in Germany  
Germany’s basic constitutional law gives each municipality the right to handle local matters as it sees 
fit (Article 28 (2) constitutional law). This so-called “autonomy of usage” is designed to encourage 
flexibility and ensure efficient expenditure planning. The federation imposes income tax, value-added 
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tax, and most excise taxes and tolls; the federal states impose vehicle and wealth taxes; and the 
municipalities mainly impose business and property taxes (Rudzio, 2003).  
Business tax is a tax on the profits made by commercial enterprises. Property tax is levied on the 
possession of land and property. The municipalities decide on the level of the tax multipliers that have 
a direct impact on the amount of their business and property tax revenues. The multiplier is determined 
annually in the municipal budget statutes and represents a given percentage by which the basic federal 
rate is multiplied. A summary of the statistics on the levels of these tax multipliers is provided in Table 
2. In comparison with other German states, NRW has high tax-multipliers (Goerl et al., 2013). 
Most municipalities receive transfers representing a significant source of revenue for them. These 
transfers are of two major kinds: (a) non-matching transfers (allgemeine Zuweisungen) mainly formula-
based transfers (Schlüsselzuweisungen), where the recipient municipality has full power of disposal, and 
(b) matching transfers (zweckgebundene Zuweisungen), where the transfer authority can influence the 
use of the funds in question. (Tanzmann, 2012). 
2.2. Fiscal Equalization in NRW  
In NRW, around 85 percent of all funds within the equalization scheme are allocated via formula-based 
transfers. About 80 percent of these transfers are assigned to municipalities and cities with county status; 
the rest goes to higher-order authorities (Goerl et al., 2013).  
One important aspect of the institutional background is the way different-sized municipalities are 
treated. The fiscal need is determined by a formula that combines the main component (Haupansatz) or 
weight function (Baskaran, 2016), which depends on the population level lagged by two years, and the 
subordinate component (Nebenansatz), which takes other factors into account. To calculate the weight 
function, population of a municipality is multiplied by a weighting factor that depends on the population 
bracket a municipality belongs to.2 This scheme is designed to account for the increasing fiscal 
expenditure for every additional citizen and the increasing costs for the provision of public goods and 
services (so-called Einwohnerveredelung). In NRW, and most other federal states, weighting factors 
                                                     
2 In NRW there are 19 or 20 such brackets depending on the year of fiscal equalization, see Appendix Table A1. 
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corresponding to population between the staggered levels are calculated by linear interpolation. This is 
a difference to the practice of stepwise weighting in Hesse described in Baskaran (2016).  
In the subordinate component of the fiscal needs formula, other factors such as the number of school 
students and a factor on municipal centrality are accounted for. The sum of the components gives the 
total (Gesamtansatz) to determine the fiscal need measure.3 The compensation rate in NRW amounts to 
90 percent. This means that if fiscal need is higher than fiscal capacity, 90 percent of the difference is 
made up for. If the fiscal need of a municipality is lower than its fiscal capacity, it is classified as 
“abundant”. This applies to only a few municipalities in our sample.4 
2.3. The Adjustments in the Formula-based Transfers in 2011 and 2012 
In 2011 and 2012, two adjustments in the population brackets were implemented in NRW, which had 
the potential to change the bracket a given municipality belonged to (see Appendix Table A1) and 
thereby change the transfers a municipality received. The adjustments were carried out due to the 
requirement of the law on municipal financing and of the constitutional court of NRW to adapt to current 
developments and to changed statistical data. They were intended to guarantee equity for the distribution 
of transfers between municipalities (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Municipal Issues NRW (MIK), 
2016). In both cases, the changes were agreed on shortly before the respective law on municipal 
financing came into force. Major structural changes were not intended by the adjustments. Changes in 
the equalization formula induced by reforms were previously studied in Lower Saxony, but with a focus 
on tax competition (Egger et al., 2010). 
For the law on municipal financing 2011, basic data, which serve as the fundament for the projection of 
(so called “fictitious”) fiscal need and tax capacity were updated to base year 2008. The update 
concerned for instance the data on the composition of the population and the number of school students. 
Such updates are implemented in irregular intervals in NRW, the previous one was in 2003 (to the base 
                                                     
3 The NRW equalization law is available from: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Municipal Issues North Rhine-
Westphalia (2013), https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_vbl_detail_text?anw_nr=6&vd_id=13793&sg=0&menu=1. 
4 In a separate estimation in the section on robustness we restrict the sample to municipalities with transfers p.c. 
in the lowest 25 percent quantile which mainly includes abundant municipalities. 
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year 1999). Following the data update, fictitious fiscal need for the upcoming years was extrapolated 
based on regression analysis. As a result, adjustments in the population brackets were implemented.  
 
In addition to data updating, the MIK periodically assigns researchers with expert reports on the analysis 
and advancement of the municipal fiscal equalization scheme.5 They are carried out due to changes in 
socio-economic and institutional conditions. By the assignment of those reports, the government aims 
to identify requirements for adjustment based on the current legal situation. The last expert report 
(Büttner et al., 2008) inspired a lengthy debate on the projection methods employing regression analysis 
and on the overall design of the equalization scheme in NRW, e.g. on the elements included. On the 
basis of further research and consultations, a modification of the weight function was agreed upon (a 
demographic factor and a factor for the municipal area was inserted into the regressions). This again led 
to an adjustment of the population brackets, which came into force in 2012.  
As the population of municipalities in each year is known, it is possible to calculate the corresponding 
change in weighting factors due to both adjustments for each municipality. For these calculations, the 
population lagged by two years must be applied, as is specified in the fiscal equalization law (MIK 
NRW, 2013). Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the two adjustments on the weight function and the 
transfers per capita in four exemplary municipalities. The left panel shows the difference between the 
initial level of the weight function in 2009 and the actual level in the following years (in percentage 
points). The right panel does the same for the received transfers per capita. As displayed, in 2011 all 
four municipalities received less transfers compared to the previous year. The adjustments of 2012 
resulted in higher transfers. The figure suggests correlation between the changes in the weight function 
and the changes in transfers. 
                                                     
5 Ministry for Internal Affairs and Municipal Issues of the state North Rhine-Westphalia, 
http://m.mik.nrw.de/themen-aufgaben/kommunales/kommunale-finanzen/kommunaler-finanzausgleich/analyse-
weiterentwicklung.html. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the adjustment in the weight function and the changes in transfers per capita for 
four municipalities.  
Source: Data from official statistical office NRW (Genesis online, 2016), own calculations. 
 
Both adjustments were introduced when the respective law on municipal financing was adopted and 
came into force. Not until then the municipalities were informed about the effective amount of formula-
based transfers they receive and could never influence these decisions in any kind. Municipalities were 
thus presumably not able to tailor their policies and expenditures in advance. As discussed in the section 
on the empirical strategy, our main identifying assumption in the estimation of the flypaper effect is that 
the exogenous adjustments of the population brackets and thus in the weighting factors in years 2011 
and 2012 induce exogenous changes in formula-based transfers received by the municipalities. These 
adjustments will be used in the instrumental variables estimations below.  
A note of caution has to be placed here. The changes in the population brackets and thus in weighting 
factors play an important role for the fiscal need measure but fiscal capacity stays unaffected. Thus, only 
one main factor for the calculation of the formula-based transfers is altered by the adjustments. In the 
estimations, we test whether this is enough to identify the exogenous variation of the transfers. 
3. DATA  
The investigation is performed using a dataset on all municipalities in the German federal state of North 
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). In our sample, NRW consists of 396 municipalities for the investigation 
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period 2009-2015. Accordingly, the final sample contains 2,772 observations in NRW. The data were 
obtained from the statistical database Genesis online (2016).  
The selection of NRW is mainly motivated by the two adjustments in 2011 and 2012, which are used 
for identification of the causal impact of transfers. Other reasons for the selection of the sample are the 
availability of detailed data on the structure of municipal revenue sources and municipal expenditures. 
In addition, NRW is the most highly populated state with almost a quarter of all German population. 
The relevant part of the transfer allocation scheme of NRW is very representative in the German context. 
The investigation period is limited by data availability. Data before 2009 is not as suitable due to changes 
from the cameralistics to the double-entry bookkeeping. In addition, data on the structure of expenditures 
is provided with a delay of two years at least. The rather short time period could limit the conclusions 
that can be drawn, especially tax rates might be long run decisions. Nevertheless, municipal councils 
decide on changes in the tax multipliers each year again and as Table A3 shows, variation in the tax 
multipliers is high. Furthermore, previous studies based their estimations on datasets of similar length 
(e.g. Baskaran, 2016; Dahlberg et al., 2008). We normalized all monetary values using the consumer 
price index with the base year 2010. 
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Table 1. Average structure of municipal revenues and expenditures in NRW (2009-2015). 
Revenue category Share Expenditure category Share 
Business tax 19-21 % Transport, infrastructure, and 
construction (TIC)  
13-14 % 
Property tax 6 % Administration 54-56 % 
Income tax 12-13 % Business development 1-2 % 
Other general municipal taxes 1-2 % Public facilities 3-4 % 
Formula-based transfers 12 % Culture and sports 3-4 % 
Investment transfers 3-5 % Health system 1 % 
Transfers and grants for present 
purposes 
4-5 % Social system 12-14 % 
Other general transfers 2-3 % Education 6-7 % 
Other revenue sources 33-41 %   
Source: own calculations based on Genesis online (2016) 
Two major local revenue sources are business tax and income tax. Formula-based transfers constitute 
on average 12 percent of the overall municipal revenues. The public spending shares in Table 1 indicate 
that administration expenditure represents the major subcategory, followed by the social system and 
infrastructure (TIC) subcategories. Detailed definitions of the expenditure subcategories can be found 
in the Appendix (see Table A2).  
Table 2 shows summary statistics and gives an overview of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
As presented in this table, the variation of the outcome variables – expenditures and tax multipliers – is 
high. This expresses the large degree of spending autonomy municipalities in NRW have. The selection 
of control variables is mainly based on the previous literature. Certain expenditures in the municipalities 
may differ depending on the proportion of young and old people in the population. A high number of 
elderly people may lead to high health expenditures. Population density may capture higher per capita 
expenditures, notably in the large towns. Population density in our sample is rather strongly correlated 
with population size; therefore, the population variable is not separately included into the estimations. 
The variable unemployed per capita (the unemployment rate is not available at municipal level) is also 
included to control for temporal economic shocks at the municipal level. Finally, spending behaviour of 
municipalities controlled by an absolute majority of conservative parties could be different compared to 
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municipalities with other majorities, they might tend to be more rigorous savers. As a political control 
variable we hence introduce the percentages of votes for conservative/ right-wing parties. 
Table 2. Summary statistics. 
          Obs. Population-
weighted 
mean 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Expenditures (p.c.)       
Total expenditure  2772 2619.6 2032.7 538.2 1056.5 7878.6 
TIC  2772 326.4 272.4 131.9 0.3 1065.2 
Administration  2772 1187.5 1147.2 321.4 509.8 6486.1 
Business development  2772 38.5 31.5 56.1 0 1443.5 
Public facilities  2772 104.6 70.9 44.2 3.8 427.3 
Culture/ Sports  2772 107.9 62.6 43.7 0 356.5 
Health system  2772 19.45 12.9 9.1 0 267.8 
Social system  2772 670.9 285.7 276.5 8 2008.1 
Education  2772 164.3 149.4 68.1 13.6 569.4 
Transfers (p.c.)       
Formula-based transfers  2772 311.2 194.2 170.5 -38.4 1116.9 
Transfers for present 
purposes 
2772 102.5 105.2 47.8 0.2 665.7 
Investment transfers 2772 126.5 83.6 58.4 0 336.1 
Tax multipliers       
Property tax multiplier, % 2772 479.2 436.2 74.7 240 876 
Business tax multiplier, % 2772 448 428.4 28.7 285 550 
Other Indicators       
% Age 65+ 2772 20.5 20.2 2.16 12.3 31.7 
Population density 2772 1246.2 504.9 533.3 43.2 3221.2 
Conservative vote shares 2772 0.45 0.51 0.11 0.19 0.81 
Unemployed p.c. 2772 4.29 3.16 1.18 0.66 7.25 
Instruments (Cross-section) 
Adjustment 2011 (change 
in weighting factor rates 
2011 compared to 2009), % 
points  
 
396 
 
-0.74 
 
-0.14 
 
0.38 
 
-4.88 
 
0 
Adjustment 2012 (change 
in weighting factor rates 
2012 compared to 2011), % 
points 
396 0.88 0.17 0.52 0 4.88 
Notes: Statistics for pooled observations 2009-2015. Monetary values in euro, prices of 2010. Summary 
statistics for the instruments reported for the year of the adjustments implementation only. 
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4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To test for the existence of the flypaper effect we estimate the relationships between non-matching 
transfers and public spending as well as between non-matching transfers and tax rates set by 
municipalities. Different expenditure categories and tax rates are the dependent variables in the 
respective regressions. The key explanatory variable is always the value of the non-matching transfers 
(per capita). The flypaper effect exists if the value of the corresponding coefficient is statistically 
significant and positive in the expenditure regressions and not significant in the tax-rate regressions 
(Knight, 2002; Gordon, 2004; Dahlberg et al., 2008; Ferede and Islam, 2015; Baskaran, 2016).  
For the estimations we employ a two-stage least squares method (2SLS) with instrumental variables 
applied to a panel dataset (for completeness, OLS results are presented in the Appendix Table A4). The 
motivation for this choice is the endogeneity problem known from previous literature. In particular, the 
size of the non-matching transfers is non-random. Hence, there may be a bias stemming from 
unobserved attributes of the municipalities that influence both, transfers and expenditures. Additionally, 
the amount of transfers a municipality receives also depends on its tax revenues and thus, presumably, 
on the own expenditures, i.e. transfers influence expenditures and vice versa (Becker 1996). This is the 
bias from reverse causality. Our identification strategy is based on exploiting two exogenous 
adjustments in the population brackets and thus in the weighting factors determining the fiscal needs (as 
explained in Section 2).  
In the first stage of 2SLS, the transfer per capita variable is decomposed into a component explained by 
the instrument and a problematic component vit. The first stage is specified as follows:  
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡
2011 + 𝛼2𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡
2012 + 𝒂 ∙ 𝑿 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 , where                                               (1) 
TRit = non-matching transfers per capita of municipality i in year t; 
𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡
2011= the difference between the weighting factor applying to municipality i in year t according to 
the 2011 adjustment and the weighting factor applying according to the initial rules (equal to zero in 
years 2009-2010); 
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𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡
2012= the difference between the weighting factor applying to municipality i in year t according to 
the 2012 adjustment and the weighting factor applying according to the 2011 adjustment (equal to zero 
in years 2009-2011); 
X = vector of other explanatory variables; 
𝜇𝑡  = set of year fixed effects; 
𝛾𝑖 = time-invariant municipal fixed effects.  
In the second stage of 2SLS, the fitted values of 𝑇?̂? from the first stage are used instead of the 
problematic (endogenous) value of TR. The second stage is specified as follows:   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇?̂?𝑖𝑡 + 𝒃 ∙ 𝑿 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,  where                                                                              (2) 
yit= either expenditures per capita (total and subcategories) or business tax multiplier or property tax 
multiplier. 
As explained above, the motivation for the two adjustments came from the need to take account of the 
newest data and methods for the projection of the fiscal needs. The municipalities did not influence these 
decisions. Tasks or actual fiscal needs of the municipalities did not change due to these adjustments in 
the equalization scheme. The adjustments were not specifically intended to address indebted 
municipalities, which speaks against a possible reverse effect of the dependent variables on the 
instruments.6 This was confirmed by the department on municipalities of the MIK in personal 
communications. Moreover, the adjustments were introduced straight away with no announcement 
period. Based on these considerations and the explanations in Section 2, we can rule out any direct effect 
of the instruments on the dependent variables.7 
Furthermore, the adjustments had no other purpose than the determination of the fiscal needs measure, 
which only had an impact on the amount of non-matching transfers. Tax bases, tax rates, or other kinds 
                                                     
6 Indebted municipalities were considered in an extra law on budget consolidation as of 2011 
(Stärkungspaktgesetz). Extra consolidation aids are granted for 61 municipalities for restructuring their budgets. 
We address this in a separate estimation in the robustness section. 
7 To support the argument further that the adjustments changed the transfers quasi-exogenously, we divided the 
sample of affected municipalities into a top-50% group with strongest positive effects of the adjustments within 
their respective size categories, and a bottom-50% group. We then performed t-tests comparing actual before-
shock expenditures of the two groups and did not find significant differences. Results can be obtained from the 
authors upon request. 
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of transfers were not directly affected by the two adjustments. We can therefore rule out effects running 
through omitted variables. The absence of the direct effect of the instruments on the dependent variables 
and of the effect running through omitted variables suggest that our instruments are valid and not 
correlated with the error term (exclusion restrictions).8 To strengthen the argument that the instruments 
are exogenous we present the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions in the results section. 
Municipal fixed effects are included in the regressions to capture the unobserved characteristics of the 
municipalities and reduce the omitted variables bias. Comparing the within-variance of the relevant 
regressors with their between-variance is an indicator for the power of the fixed effects model. The 
larger the within-variance, the better the performance of the fixed effects model will be (Plümper and 
Troeger, 2007). Table A3 in the Appendix reports total, between, and within standard deviations for the 
key variables. From this table it becomes clear that the within variation is not small, thus fixed effects 
can be included. Furthermore, year fixed effects are included to capture shocks common to all 
municipalities. In the robustness section, we also estimate specifications that include linear time trends. 
We employ two main specifications: a model with a lagged dependent variable (Model I), and a model 
without the lagged dependent variable (Model II). Both specifications include a full set of year and 
municipal fixed effects. The set of other control variables includes population shares of residents older 
than 65 years, population density, vote shares for conservative parties in the municipal councils and 
unemployed per capita. Results of 2SLS regressions without these further control variables are also 
reported. 
A lagged dependent variable could be used to untangle contemporaneous and past effects of transfers. 
Municipalities that received more transfers in the past - before the adjustments – could later have higher 
expenditures. Including this control should in our case not bias the estimation of the effect of transfers 
because the identification is based on the exogenous instruments (Baskaran, 2016).9 If the results from 
                                                     
8 Nevertheless, the robustness of our estimates to small deviations from the assumption of strict exogeneity of the 
instrumental variables is examined applying the methodology of Conley et al. (2012) in the robustness section.  
9 A lagged dependent variable should only be included if the stationarity condition of the dependent variable holds 
(Keele and Kelly, 2005). For short panels like ours this cannot be tested reliably. However, it does make sense to 
assume stationarity in our case. The Harris-Tzavalis panel-data unit-root test rejects the null hypothesis of our 
panel containing unit roots. 
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the two models are similar, we will however prefer the specification without the lagged variable due to 
econometric problems some other authors report (Achen, 2001; Keele and Kelly, 2005).10 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Key Estimates 
The results of the second-stage IV estimations for total municipal expenditures, eight expenditure 
subcategories and for the tax multipliers are presented in Table 3.11 The first-stage results are reported 
in Table A6 of the Appendix. We report clustered standard errors with the municipalities as the unit of 
clustering in all estimations.12 
As can be seen from the significance of the corresponding coefficients in the first stage (see Table A6), 
our instruments are strong predictors for the transfers per capita. The 2011 adjustment affected the level 
of transfers negatively on average, and the 2012 adjustment – positively. In addition, we report the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic as a test for the strength of our instruments in Table 3. The F-statistic 
values indicate that the instruments are strong and relevant. Additionally, looking at the t-values of the 
coefficients of the excluded variables in the first stage strengthens the belief that our instruments are 
relevant. Figure 1 furthermore shows that our instruments reasonably describe the changes of the 
transfers.  
Because our model is over-identified (two instruments and one endogenous variable), we report the p-
values of the Hansen J test. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid and hence 
uncorrelated with the error term as well as correctly excluded (Baum et al., 2003). The Hansen J test for 
the key models in Table 3 reports that both instruments are valid and correctly excluded, since the null 
hypothesis is not rejected in all estimations, except for the education subcategory. The results for the 
education subcategory are discussed below. 
                                                     
10 In this case we also applied a system GMM estimation as suggested by Arrelano and Bond (1991). The results 
however do not differ significantly from the 2SLS results and can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
11 IV regressions are estimated using the Stata package XTIVREG2 by Schaffer (2010). 
12 Biased OLS results are reported in Table A4 in the Appendix. 2SLS estimates without further control variables 
are given in Table A5. They provide first signs for the existence of the flypaper effect in the total and social 
expenditures. 
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For the total municipal expenditures, Table 3 reports a coefficient of transfers positive and significantly 
different from zero (but not significantly different from unity) in all specifications. One can thus say 
that an increase in non-matching transfers by one euro per capita increases total expenditures by roughly 
one euro per capita. This is a large effect of transfers on public spending. The estimate of Baskaran 
(2016) for Hesse was in the range of 70-90 cents, fixed effects excluded. Dahlberg et al. (2008) found a 
similar effect of up to 1.46 euro (also not significantly different from one), fixed effects included. 
In Table 3, we also examine the effect of transfers on the two tax multipliers. The estimates suggest no 
significant impact of transfers on the business tax multiplier throughout all models. A rise in non-
matching transfers thus results in higher local spending but does not reduce taxes. These findings 
indicate the existence of the flypaper effect in the municipalities of NRW.  
Next, we investigate the effect of transfers on different expenditure subcategories. For the specification 
including a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects (Model I), the coefficient of transfers is 
significant in only two subcategories: social system and public facilities (Table 3). The coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable (not reported in the table) is significant in both cases. 
In Model II, in line with Model I, the coefficient of the transfers is significant in these two subcategories, 
too. The public facility subcategory in particular covers spending on environmental, fire-protection and 
emergency services. The expenditure types with the largest share in the social system subcategory 
comprise primary care, basic social benefits and day care facilities for children. Both subcategories 
mainly include types of expenditures that are implemented at a faster pace as compared to e.g. spatial 
planning/ development or tourism expenditures from other subcategories. A lagged dependent variable 
is excluded and contemporaneous and past effects of transfers are thus conflated in Model II. We may 
conclude that in the two subcategories extra money from non-matching transfers is spent in the same 
year as received. 
The insignificant effect of non-matching transfers on education and business development expenditures 
in all specifications can be explained by the fact that these expenditures are mostly financed at state 
level. Business development is mostly supported by dedicated or matched transfers, such as investment 
transfers. As far as municipal expenditures on education are concerned, these only include construction 
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expenses as well as general and material expenses of local schools, which are also likely to be related to 
dedicated financing. It is also worth noting that NRW grants extra flat transfers to support municipal 
tasks for the school sector and early childhood education (in addition to formula-based transfers). 
Interestingly, the subcategory with the largest per capita expenses - administration - does not profit from 
general purpose transfers according to the key estimates. This finding is comparable with the results of 
Weicher (1972); Grossman (1990); and Moisio (2002), whose analyses of the flypaper effect are partly 
category-specific as well. Formula-based, non-matching transfers are thus used to increase spending on 
social system rather than for administrative expenses.  
Concerning the other control variables, we find that the unemployed per capita and a high share of 
residents older than 65 years (age 65+) have the strongest impact on the expenditures. Both variables 
positively affect municipal expenditures. 
To summarize, money from additional non-matching transfers has a large impact on total municipal 
expenditures (coefficient not significantly different from unity) but no effect on local tax rates (the 
flypaper effect is confirmed). This result is very plausible especially in the view of tight municipal 
budgets, which forces local governments to spend extra financial resources from transfers completely 
instead of lowering tax rates. It is consistent with the earlier findings in related studies. In addition, 
examining the flypaper effect in different expenditure subcategories produces interesting results. The 
effect of transfers on expenditure subcategories could only be identified in the social system and the 
public facility specifications. 
Next section is given over to robustness checks where we examine the key estimates’ sensitivity.  
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Table 3. Second-stage IV regression results. 
Dependent variable:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Total
exp. 
TIC Admin. Pub.
facilities 
Bus.
devel. 
Culture/ 
Sport 
Health Social 
system 
Education Property 
tax 
Business 
tax 
 (1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Model I (lagged DV, 
FE) 
           
Transfers per capita 
 
1.049** 
(0.4210) 
0.111 
(0.1074) 
0.181 
(0.2533) 
0.092** 
(0.0446) 
0.054 
(0.0585) 
-0.039 
(0.0426) 
-0.001 
(0.0105) 
0.974*** 
(0.2157) 
0.029 
(0.049) 
0.019 
(0.0496) 
-0.008 
(0.0129) 
N 
F 
2375 
27.17 
2375 
11.82 
2375 
19.38 
2375 
3.56 
2375 
1.06 
2375 
8.15 
2375 
2.85 
2375 
59.02 
2375 
12.66 
2375 
181.34 
2375 
208 
First-stage diagnostic            
Kleibergen-Paap F 
statistic 
Over-Identification test 
(Hansen J, p-value) 
25.65 
 
0.8430 
25.14 
 
0.7890 
25.35 
 
0.4066 
25.22 
 
0.7687 
25.39 
 
0.3329 
25.26 
 
0.5440 
24.94 
 
0.9700 
20.52 
 
0.9214 
25.39 
 
0.0041 
24.64 
 
0.0509 
24.48 
 
0.8064 
            
Model II (no lagged 
DV, FE) 
           
Transfers per capita 
 
1.656*** 
(0.4717) 
0.158 
(0.1196) 
0.164 
(0.2334) 
0.066* 
(0.0393) 
-0.027 
(0.0487) 
-0.011 
(0.0466) 
-0.014 
(0.0128) 
1.35*** 
(0.3139) 
-0.028 
(0.0616) 
0.111 
(0.0826) 
0.021 
(0.0214) 
N 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 
F 16.79 7.54 13.50 2.57 0.58 5.13 2.88 34.84 6.47 68.71 59.69 
First-stage diagnostic            
Kleibergen-Paap F 
statistic 
18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 18.36 
Over-Identification test 
(Hansen J, p-value) 
0.2953 0.9366 0.3288 0.1541 0.1107 0.4385 0.1782 0.2100 0.0379 0.0824 0.4122 
Note: Statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and within-municipality correlation. *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Variables excluded from the second stage: Adjustment 2011 and adjustment 2012. 
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5.2. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we perform a number of robustness checks to explore whether the key results are stable.  
We build on the specification without a lagged dependent variable and with municipal fixed effects 
included (Model II) because Models I and II differ not substantially and the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable may hold risks of biases (Achen, 2001; Keele and Kelly, 2005).  
First of all, to assess the robustness of our IV estimates to small deviations from the assumption of strict 
exogeneity of the instrumental variables (plausibly but not strictly exogenous instruments) we use the 
method proposed by Conley et al. (2012).13 More precisely, we apply the union of confidence interval 
(UCI) approach. The minimum and maximum priors for the coefficients of the two instrumental 
variables are constructed by adding and subtracting one standard deviation to/from the respective first-
stage coefficients. For the relationship between non-matching transfers per capita and total expenditures 
per capita a 2SLS estimate in the [0.789, 5.162] 95 % confidence interval is found. Thus the results of 
the UCI check show that the 2SLS estimates are robust to deviations from the strict exogeneity 
assumption because the union of confidence interval excludes zero.  
In the following, we add further control variables (in addition to the existing) or vary the sample.14 As a 
robustness check, we include two other transfer variables as additional controls in the regression. Those 
are transfers for present purposes and investment transfers, which may also have an impact on the 
expenditures of the municipalities (see Table A7). To a large extent, other transfers are bound to a 
specific spending purpose (so-called matching transfers) and may be granted in favor of municipalities 
with low formula-based transfers. These variables are not exogenous and the corresponding coefficients 
are biased. However, similar estimates regarding the non-matching transfers would give an indication 
on the robustness of the key results.  
                                                     
13 Another method to deal with so-called “imperfect instruments” is presented by Nevo and Rosen (2012).  
14 Our estimates could furthermore be sensitive to differential trends of municipalities that are affected differently 
by the adjustments – although municipal and time fixed effects are added. We therefore did two things: first, we 
included linear time trends and second, we constructed a placebo test, where the first adjustment occurs in 2009 
and the second in 2010. Including linear time trends does not change the results significantly. Regarding the 
placebo test, both artificial adjustments do not survive the first stage, their coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. Results are available upon request. 
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The results of the estimation are given in column (2) of Table A7 in the Appendix. First of all, the key 
estimates are confirmed in their main predictions. There is a significant and positive effect of transfers 
on total spending. Positive and significant effects are found in the same expenditure subcategories - 
social system and public facility - as compared to the key estimations. Transfers have no effect on the 
tax multipliers. As in the key estimations, the total expenditure coefficients are not significantly different 
from one and decreased slightly.  
As another check, we vary sample size and run regressions for municipalities with population size above 
25,000 inhabitants. The 25,000 threshold is chosen because the weighting factors stay constant until 
then (100 percent). It might be a matter of concern that we include all municipalities in the key 
estimations although only the municipalities with a population size above 25,000 inhabitants are affected 
by the adjustments of the weight function. 
As can be seen from the larger coefficients in column (3) of Table A7, the effect of transfers on the total 
expenditures has increased compared to the key estimations even though coefficients are still not 
significantly different from one. The lower significance levels of the estimates can be explained by the 
smaller sample size. Here the only significant subcategory is social expenditure.  
Next, we limit the sample to municipalities with transfers per capita in the lowest 25 percent quantile – 
including in particular abundant municipalities (municipalities with a high tax capacity that receive little 
or no transfers). The lowest 25 percent quantile includes approximately 100 municipalities. At such low 
levels of transfers (10 euro per capita on average), it should be difficult to identify a flypaper effect.  
As expected, the estimations in column (4) of Table A7 show that there is no significant impact of 
transfers on expenditures as well as on tax rates. The sample size is particularly small and thereby no 
link can be made. 
Further robustness checks of Table A7 estimate the effects of transfers on the expenditures and the tax 
rates for municipalities subject to consolidation aids. In 2011, the NRW state government commenced 
a program that supports indebted municipalities with extra consolidation aids. Municipalities that 
received such aids could be less dependent on non-matching transfers and thus distort our key estimation 
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especially regarding the expenditures in the subcategories. Column (5) however shows a pattern similar 
to the key estimates. The coefficients for the total expenditures and for public facilities are slightly 
insignificant, probably due to the smaller sample size. The impact of transfers on the social system 
expenditures, on the other hand, is still statistically significant.  
In a final check, we exclude cities with county status (Kreisfreie Städte). Those do in general have a 
wider range of tasks as compared to district municipalities. This could make comparability problematic. 
As can be seen from Table A7, the coefficient for the total expenditures is positive and significant, but 
of course smaller as compared to the key results. The value of the coefficient is closer to the one reported 
by Baskaran (2016) who excludes cities with county status throughout all estimations. In addition, the 
coefficient on business tax is significant and positive in this subsample, although quantitatively close to 
zero. An increase in transfers by one euro per capita would lead to an increase by 0.055 percentage 
points in the tax multiplier, which is neglectable. District municipalities do not spend additional transfers 
on the public facility subcategory which is reasonable because this category is of minor importance for 
those municipalities. 
The conducted robustness checks do not contradict the main finding about the existence of the flypaper 
effect in the municipal expenditures. Among the subcategories, the effect of transfers is most 
pronounced in the second-largest category, social expenditures and partly in the public facility category.   
5.3. Accounting for Spatial Dependence 
In the presence of spatial autocorrelation, least squares estimation technique is potentially biased and 
inconsistent (Anselin and Bera, 1998; Anselin et al., 2008). In our case, there may exist spatial 
correlation in the economic performance of the municipalities, which may affect both, expenditures and 
transfers. 
We therefore make an assumption on which spatial units affect each other and thus define a 
neighborhood set for each municipality. We generate a spatial weight matrix, where the elements are 
equal to one for direct neighbors and are zero otherwise (Rook contiguity). We also standardize the 
weights such that the elements in each row sum to one.  
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To test for the existence of spatial autocorrelation, the Moran’s (1950) I test is used. The null hypothesis 
states that there are no spatial effects. As can be seen from column (7) of Table A7 in the Appendix, 
spatial autocorrelation identified by the one-tailed Moran’s I test specification is found for several 
expenditure subcategories and both tax multipliers. It means that a spatial model may be relevant. 
A spatial lag operator is then added to the model, which creates a new variable (Wy) that provides the 
weighted average of the neighboring expenditures or taxes. For the estimation we use a spatial lag 
dependence model with 2SLS (Franzese and Hays, 2007; Elhorst, 2014). This setting is appropriate to 
be applied for panel data in our case.15 It produces consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates 
under the conditions that the X’s are exogenously related to y.  
The estimations with a spatially lagged dependent variable in column (8) of Table A7 show that there is 
a significant and positive effect of transfers on the total expenditures in the spatial lag-IV regression 
model. Coefficients are slightly smaller than the key estimates in Table 3 – but not significantly different 
from them. The effect of transfers on the social expenditures stays the only significant effect. Similar to 
the key estimates, no effect on tax rates is detected. This again confirms the existence of the flypaper 
effect.  
The results in this section also confirm the findings by Case et al. (1993) and Acosta (2010) in the 
context of the flypaper effect (smaller coefficient for expenditures when spatial dependency is accounted 
for).  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In line with many investigations in the empirical literature, we find robust evidence for the existence of 
a flypaper effect in the expenditures of the municipalities in the German federal state North Rhine-
Westphalia. We find that formula-based transfers increase municipal expenditures but do not reduce tax 
rates. Possible endogeneity problems are addressed by applying the instrumental variables method, 
where exogenous shocks from adjustments of the weighting function used to determine the fiscal needs 
                                                     
15 Estimation is performed using the Stata command SPLAGVAR (Jeanty, 2010). It goes beyond the scope of this 
robustness section to test for other models such as e.g. spatial error model (no autocorrelation in the error term was 
encountered). 
22 
 
are employed as instruments. The instrumental variables are shown to be strong and relevant. Analysis 
by expenditure category at a sufficiently detailed level and the use of this identification strategy is novel 
in the literature on the flypaper effect in Germany. 
As Inman (2008) puts it, “once viewed as anomaly, the flypaper effect should now be seen as a reality 
of fiscal politics”. Studying the way transfers are spent then gives useful information about citizen 
preferences for local public goods (ibid.). In this regard, we can derive two particularly important 
conclusions from our findings about the spending behavior of the municipalities in NRW. First, we 
cannot identify a significant impact of transfers on general administrative expenditures. That may be a 
positive finding, suggesting that the municipalities do not use the lump-sum transfers just in order to 
increase the administrative staff. Second, an increase of transfers is mainly used for social expenditures 
and expenditures on public facilities. That could be either a sign of public preferences for these types of 
spending or a sign that the social system and public facilities are both underfinanced and can be covered 
with the help of additional transfers only. These findings however do not provide evidence of inefficient 
use of funds, which would support an idea of earmarking of non-matching transfers.  
The robustness checks reveal that only limiting the sample to financially strong (abundant) 
municipalities eliminates the evidence of the flypaper effect in the expenditure subcategories. 
Accounting for spatial interdependence tends to reduce the estimated coefficients of transfers but keeps 
the key findings unaltered (significance does not change). Our findings should be transferable to most 
other German states, where similar weight functions are used. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. NRW weight function and its adjustments. 
Weight function 2009   Weight function 2011 Weight function  2012 
Category 
(Population 
size) 
Weighting 
factor % 
Number of 
municipalities 
Category 
(Population 
size) 
Weighting 
factor % 
Category 
(Population 
size) 
Weighting 
factor % 
≤25,000 100 222 ≤25,000 100 ≤25,000 100 
37,500 103 63 38,500 103 37,000 103 
52,500 106 40 54,500 106 51,500 106 
70,500 109 23 73,500 109 68,500 109 
90,500 112 14 95,000 112 88,000 112 
113,500 115 8 120,000 115 110,000 115 
139,000 118 3 147,000 118 134,000 118 
167,000 121 4 177,500 121 160,500 121 
197,500 124 4 210,500 124 189,500 124 
230,500 127 1 246,500 127 221,000 127 
266,000 130 4 285,000 130 255,000 130 
304,500 133 1 326,500 133 291,000 133 
345,000 136 2 371,000 136 329,500 136 
388,500 139 2 418,500 139 370,500 139 
434,500 142 0 468,500 142 414,000 142 
482,500 145 0 521,000 145 460,000 145 
533,500 148 1 577,000 148 508,000 148 
587,000 151 3 635,500 151 558,500 151 
634,000 154 0 >635,500 154 611,500 154 
>634,000 157 1   >611,500 157 
Source: MIK NRW 2009, 2011, 2012. 
 
Table A2. The expenditure subcategories. 
Expenditure 
subcategory  
Type of expenditure 
Transport, 
infrastructure, 
construction 
(TIC) 
Spatial planning and development, geo-information, construction and property 
regulation, housing- construction funding, electricity, gas, water, district heat 
supply, waste management, sewage disposal, municipal-roads, district-roads, 
state-roads, federal-roads, road cleaning, parking facilities, public transport, 
other passenger and goods transport, ports 
Administration Administration management and service, statistics and elections, regulatory 
affairs, funeral and cemetery services, taxes, general transfers and general 
levies, general financial economy 
Business 
development 
General institutions and companies, business development, tourism 
Public facilities Fire protection, emergency services, large-scale emergencies, disaster control, 
public green areas, nature and rural conservation, agriculture and forestry, 
environmental measures, immission protection, landscaping, public waters, 
water supply plants, monument conservation and care 
Culture/ Sport Museums, exhibitions, zoological and botanical gardens, theater, public music 
culture, music schools, adult education center, libraries, other adult education, 
cultural education, national education, clerical affairs 
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Health system Health administration, hospitals, health care, recreational facility, spas and bath 
houses   
Social system Primary care, basic social benefits,  benefits for asylum seekers, social 
facilities, war victim welfare, benefits under the Federal Pensions Act, benefits 
for severely disabled persons, funding of welfare carriers, benefits for living, 
inclusion of disabled persons, help with care, advances  on maintenance 
payments, assistance services, funding for returnees and political prisoners, 
other social services, day care facilities for children, funding for children, 
youth work, services for young people and families   
Education Primary schools, secondary schools, combined primary and secondary schools, 
high schools, comprehensive schools, vocational schools, special schools, other 
formal school tasks, science and research 
Source: Genesis online (2016).  
 
Table A3. Between- and within-variation of key variables. 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
Transfers p.c. overall 194.2 170.50 N = 2772 
 between  159.28 n = 396 
 within   61.29 T = 7 
Expenditures p.c. overall 2032.7 538.16 N = 2772 
 between  487.9 n = 396 
 within   228.24 T = 7 
Property tax multiplier overall 436.2 74.71 N = 2772 
 between  54.82 n = 396 
 within   50.82 T = 7 
Business tax multiplier overall 428.4 28.68 N = 2772 
 between  25.43 n = 396 
 within   13.32 T = 7 
Population share above 65 overall 0.2 .02 N = 2772 
 between  .02 n = 396 
 within   .004 T = 7 
Population Density overall 504.9 533.31 N = 2772 
 between  533.76 n = 396 
 within   11.66 T = 7 
Share of right-wing votes overall 0.5 0.11 N = 2772 
 between  0.10 n = 396 
 within   0.03 T = 7 
Unemployed p.c. overall 3.2 1.18 N = 2772 
 between  1.16 n = 396 
 within   0.25 T = 7 
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Table A4. Parsimonious OLS regression results. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These OLS regressions include fixed effects and year dummies but no further control variables. 
 
Table A5. Parsimonious IV regression results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These OLS regressions include fixed effects and year dummies but no further control variables. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Total exp. TIC Admin. Pub. 
facilities 
Bus. 
devel. 
Culture/ 
Sport 
Health Social 
system 
Education Property 
tax 
Business 
tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Transfers per capita 0.186* 
(0.1099) 
0.035 
(0.0266) 
0.038 
(0.0839) 
0.001 
(0.0077) 
0.005 
(0.0123) 
-0.005 
(0.0098) 
-0.001 
(0.0011) 
0.126*** 
(0.0339) 
-0.014 
(0.0122) 
0.058*** 
(0.0191) 
0.012** 
(0.0050) 
N 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 
F 25.25 9.28 17.94 2.74 0.77 7.46 3.45 126.23 9.33 114.72 82.97 
Dependent variable: Total exp. TIC Admin. Pub. 
facilities 
Bus. 
devel. 
Culture/ 
Sport 
Health Social 
system 
Education Property 
tax 
Business 
tax 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Transfers per capita 1.76*** 
(0.4587) 
0.159 
(0.1178) 
0.29 
(0.2205) 
0.05 
(0.0339) 
-0.024 
(0.0404) 
-0.013 
(0.0409) 
-0.019 
(0.0121) 
1.328*** 
(0.299) 
-0.013 
(0.0524) 
0.068 
(0.0783) 
0.018 
(0.0177) 
N 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 2771 
F 21.56 9.28 14.52 2.99 0.76 7.00 2.78 52.55 9.11 112.86 80.66 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 17.00 17.00 
 
17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 
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Table A6. First-stage results for the instruments. 
Dependent variable in 
the second stage:    
  Total exp. TIC Admin. Pub. 
facilities 
Bus. 
devel. 
Culture/ 
Sport 
Health Social 
system 
Education  Property 
tax 
Business 
tax 
 
(1) (2)    (3)        (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Model I (lagged DV, 
FE) 
           
Adjustment 2011 
 
Adjustment 2012 
-26.58*** 
(7.87) 
36.39*** 
(6.26) 
-26.87*** 
(7.98) 
35.65*** 
(6.27) 
-26.6*** 
(7.68) 
35.92*** 
(6.28) 
-26.93*** 
(7.98) 
35.67*** 
(6.27) 
-26.99*** 
(8.01) 
35.68*** 
(6.29) 
-26.9*** 
(7.99) 
35.7*** 
(6.28) 
-26.82*** 
(8.00) 
35.7*** 
(6.28) 
-27.76*** 
(7.65) 
32.43*** 
(6.95) 
-26.76*** 
(7.95) 
35.81*** 
(6.27) 
-26.77*** 
(7.98) 
35.13*** 
(6.33) 
-25.91*** 
(7.86) 
35.39*** 
(6.29) 
    
Model II (no lagged 
DV, FE) 
   
Adjustment 2011 
 
Adjustment 2012 
-22.86*** 
(8.49) 
36.09*** 
(6.51) 
Same as for total expenditures Same as for total 
expenditures 
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Table A7. Robustness checks (Model II, second-stage results).  
Note: Statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and within-municipality correlation: *: p<0.1, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
Variables excluded from the second stage: Adjustment 2011 and adjustment 2012. 
 
 Key estimates  Other transfers  
added as controls 
Sample variation: 
Population 
>25000 
Sample variation:  
Transfers p.c. in 
the lowest 25 % 
quantile 
Sample variation:  
municipalities 
with 
consolidation aids  
Sample variation:  
excluding  cities 
with county 
status 
Moran’s I (p) Spatial Lag IV 
(lag order 1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Total expenditure 
 
1.656*** 
(0.4717) 
1.432*** 
(0.4656) 
2.405** 
(1.0246) 
9.124 
(29.58) 
1.675 
(1.093) 
1.341* 
(0.7154) 
0.0288** 
(0.0135) 
1.634*** 
(0.4512) 
N 2771 2771 1196 704 427 2624  2771 
Wald test (p-value) 
H0= coefficient not 
signif. different from 1 
0.1644 0.3536 0.1703 - - 0.6338  0.1598 
TIC  
 
0.158 
(0.1196) 
0.141 
(0.1187) 
0.351 
(0.2453) 
-4.304 
(11.16) 
0.172 
(0.2118) 
0.023 
(0.1694) 
0.016 
(0.1782) 
 
Administration 0.164 
(0.2334) 
0.1 
(0.2436) 
0.356 
(0.5225) 
3.44 
(26.72) 
-0.035 
(0.3851) 
0.272 
(0.5242) 
0.006 
(0.5785) 
 
Public facilities 0.066* 
(0.0393) 
0.065* 
(0.0383) 
0.061 
(0.0816) 
-0.042 
(1.65) 
-0.079 
(0.0563) 
0.074 
(0.0603) 
0.017 
(0.1453) 
 
Business development -0.027 
(0.0487) 
-0.031 
(0.0509) 
0.111 
(0.0834) 
-3.06 
(6.58) 
-0.071 
(0.1019) 
-0.07 
(0.0678) 
0.003 
(0.7585) 
 
Culture/Sport -0.011 
(0.0466) 
-0.026 
(0.0463) 
-0.065 
(0.0919) 
0.104 
(1.792) 
0.03 
(0.0528) 
-0.037 
(0.0791) 
0.021* 
(0.07) 
-0.013 
(0.0439) 
Health 
 
-0.014 
(0.0128) 
-0.011 
(0.0128) 
-0.047 
(0.0277) 
0.164 
(0.436) 
-0.001 
(0.0046) 
-0.02 
(0.0169) 
-0.0002 
(0.9922) 
 
Social  1.35*** 
(0.3139) 
1.244*** 
(0.3254) 
1.669** 
(0.6435) 
12.3 
(15.37) 
1.725* 
(0.9744) 
1.155*** 
(0.2961) 
0.03*** 
(0.0095) 
1.281*** 
(0.2961) 
Education 
 
-0.028 
(0.0616) 
-0.047 
(0.0617) 
-0.029 
(0.1181) 
0.491 
(2.092) 
-0.065 
(0.0939) 
-0.051 
(0.1054) 
0.009 
(0.412) 
 
Property tax 0.111 
(0.0826) 
0.11 
(0.0861) 
0.056 
(0.1767) 
-3.52 
(5.673) 
-0.343 
(0.2456) 
0.089 
(0.1012) 
0.023* 
(0.0503) 
0.093 
(0.0772) 
Business tax 0.021 
(0.0214) 
0.02 
(0.0221) 
0.044 
(0.0446) 
-2.735 
(4.836) 
-0.041 
(0.0482) 
0.055* 
(0.0316) 
0.035*** 
(0.0025) 
0.018 
(0.0208) 
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Figure 2. Per capita levels of total non-matching transfers in the municipalities of NRW (2016). 
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